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Abstract:  
In many previous works, a single-pixel imaging (SPI) system is constructed as an 
optical image encryption system. Unauthorized users are not able to reconstruct the 
plaintext image from the ciphertext intensity sequence without knowing the 
illumination pattern key. However, little cryptanalysis about encrypted SPI has been 
investigated in the past. In this work, we propose a known-plaintext attack scheme and 
a ciphertext-only attack scheme to an encrypted SPI system for the first time. The 
known-plaintext attack is implemented by interchanging the roles of illumination 
patterns and object images in the SPI model. The ciphertext-only attack is implemented 
based on the statistical features of single-pixel intensity values. The two schemes can 
crack encrypted SPI systems and successfully recover the key containing correct 
illumination patterns.   
Keywords: single-pixel imaging, ghost imaging, encryption, attack, plaintext, 
ciphertext 
 
1. Introduction 
Optical encryption, authentication and watermarking systems [1-3] can be constructed 
for information security applications, with advantages such as multi-dimensional 
parallel processing capabilities, fast processing speed and direct processing of physical 
objects without digitalization. In previous works, an image encryption system can be 
physically implemented with various types of optical imaging systems, including but 
not limited to double random phase encoding (DRPE) [4], holography [5,6], integral 
imaging [7-9], ptychography [10,11], and single-pixel imaging [12-21]. In these 
systems, the plaintext image is converted to a light field, which is optically transformed 
into a ciphertext light field with certain physical encryption keys (e.g. random phase 
masks or random illumination patterns). 
 Fig. 1. Optical setup for a single-pixel imaging system. 
 
Single-pixel imaging (SPI) [22,23] is an optical imaging technique that captures an 
object image with a single-pixel detector instead of a pixelated sensor array. After the 
target object is sequentially illuminated with many varying patterns and a single-pixel 
intensity sequence is recorded, the object image can be computationally reconstructed. 
Compared with other optical encryption architectures [4-11], the sensor is a simple 
bucket light detector and a real intensity value instead of a complex light field is 
recorded each time in an encrypted SPI system, which is easier to implement 
experimentally. A typical optical setup for a SPI system is shown in Fig. 1. 
For any type of encryption system, the security strength is always a crucial concern. 
Attacking methods can be developed to uncover the security flaws of an existing 
encryption system. In the meanwhile, the security strength of an encryption system can 
be further enhanced against these attacking methods. Like a shield and spear 
relationship, encryption methods and attacking methods (or cryptanalysis) are 
upgraded against each other iteratively to finally produce a more secure system. 
The common attacking methods for an image encryption system include chosen-
plaintext attack (CPA), known-plaintext attack (KPA) and ciphertext-only attack 
(COA). In CPA, it is assumed that the attacker can access the encryption system and 
control the input plaintext content. The security keys are recovered based on selected 
pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts. The CPA is relatively easy to implement but the 
assumption that the attacker can freely choose the plaintext may be invalid in many 
practical situations. In KPA, a number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs are available, 
which are given randomly instead of being selected by attackers. KPA can threaten an 
encryption system under more general conditions compared with CPA. In COA, the 
attacker can only access a certain number of ciphertexts and does not know any 
plaintext information. COA requires the least amount of information to crack an 
encryption system and reveals the most severe security flaw of an encryption system. 
At the same time, COA is usually most difficult to realize for an attacker. 
For other types of optical encryption systems such as DRPE [4], various 
implementations of encryption systems [24-28] and various types of cryptanalysis [29-
35] including CPA, KPA and COA have been extensively investigated. However, for 
encrypted SPI, many works have been conducted on the design of encryption systems 
[12-21] since the earliest attempt [12] but little cryptanalysis has been investigated 
previously. As far as the author knows, only one such work [36] can be found, in which 
some CPA methods are proposed. No KPA or COA schemes have even been proposed 
for encrypted SPI systems in the past. In this work, a KPA scheme and a COA scheme 
for encrypted SPI are investigated for the first time. 
 
Fig. 2. General framework of an encrypted SPI system. 
 
2. Encrypted single-pixel imaging (SPI) system 
In SPI, there are usually three major components, object image ( )O n  (n=1, 2, ..., N), 
illumination patterns ( , )K m n  (m=1, 2, ..., M; n=1, 2, ..., N) and recorded single-pixel 
intensity sequence ( )C m  (m=1, 2, …, M). In an encrypted SPI system, the object 
image ( )O n  can be employed as the plaintext image, the illumination patterns ( , )K m n  
are employed as the encryption (and decryption) key and the recorded single-pixel 
intensity sequence ( )C m  is employed as the ciphertext [12]. The general framework of 
an encrypted SPI system is shown in Fig. 2. 
It is assumed that the total number of pixels in the object image is N and the plaintext 
image can be represented by a column vector ( )O n  with length N. The total number 
of pixels in each illumination pattern is identical to the resolution of the object image. 
It is assumed that the object image ( )O n  is sequentially illuminated by a total number 
of M different illumination  patterns and all these patterns jointly constitute an 
illumination pattern matrix ( , )K m n  with M rows and N columns. The thm  single-
pixel intensity value recorded by the detector is the inner product between the thm  row 
in K and the object image ( )O n  mathematically. The single-pixel intensity sequence 
can be represented as a column vector ( )C m  (m=1, 2, ..., M) with length M. The 
mathematical model of the entire SPI imaging process can be illustrated by Eq. (1). 
The number of illuminations M can be smaller, equal and larger than the number of 
pixels N in the object image. The ratio M/N is referred to as the sampling ratio in SPI. 
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In SPI, after a total number of M illuminations and recordings, the object image can 
be computationally reconstructed from ( , )K m n  (1 ,1 )m M n N= = = =  and ( )C m  
(1 )m M= =  with various algorithms [37]. The image reconstruction in SPI is 
essentially solving a system of linear equations and finding the optimal solutions. As 
an encryption system, the plaintext image ( )O n  is recovered when both the ciphertext 
( )C m  and the key ( , )K m n  are available. For unauthorized users without knowing the 
key, the plaintext image cannot be disclosed from the ciphertext and its information 
security is protected. 
In practical SPI experiments, the projection devices for pattern illuminations, such as 
digital micromirror device (DMD), are usually binary [38, 39]. Each pixel in the 
illumination patterns can be assumed as a random binary value 0 or 1. The total number 
of possible combinations for M illumination patterns in the key space is 2MN . A brute-
force attack is hard to realize by attackers since it takes a very huge amount of 
computational resources to attempt all possible combinations to reconstruct the true 
plaintext image when the key is not known. If any information about the M 
illumination patterns in the key is not open to public, the system is referred as Type I 
encrypted SPI system in this paper. The data size of all the M illumination patterns 
(each one has N pixels) can be considerably large and the transmission & storage cost 
of encryption (and decryption) keys can be rather high. As an alternative, the 
permutation of illumination patterns, instead of the original illumination patterns, can 
be employed as the key, referred to as Type II encrypted SPI system in this paper. In a 
Type II system, the pixel values of original M illumination patterns before permutation 
are open to public. However, the order is random and remains secret to authorized 
users only. For example, the original 5th illumination pattern may be arranged as the 
first one in the key and the original 7th pattern may be arranged as second one. The 
total number of possible combinations in the key is !M  (“!” refers to factorial) for a 
total number of M illumination patterns. Even though !M  is significantly smaller than 
2MN , the key space in a Type II system still grows very fast as the value of M increases. 
For example, if there are only M=16 illumination patterns totally, they can already be 
arranged in 16 != 20922789888000 possible ways. The number of possible 
combinations can reach 352.6 10  when M=32. A brute-force attack is hard to realize 
by attackers for a Type II system as well. In Fig. 3, Type I and Type II encrypted SPI 
systems are compared. In this work, some investigations of KPA and COA are 
conducted for encrypted SPI systems including both Type I and Type II. 
 Fig. 3. Type I and Type II encrypted SPI systems. 
 
3. Known-plaintext attack (KPA) to encrypted single-pixel imaging (SPI) 
As stated above, the plaintext image can only be recovered from the ciphertext (i.e. the 
single-pixel intensity sequence) when the key (containing all the illumination patterns) 
is known. However, if the same key is repetitively employed to encrypt different object 
images, the attacker may collect all these plaintext images and corresponding 
ciphertext intensity sequences. From these plaintext-ciphertext pairs, the attacker can 
possibly figure out most of the pixel values in the key and crack the encryption system. 
A known plaintext attack (KPA) scheme for encrypted SPI is proposed in this paper 
for the first time. Our proposed KPA is similar to the image reconstruction process in 
conventional SPI but the roles of illumination patterns and object images are 
interchanged. In conventional SPI, the object image is sequentially illuminated by 
varying illumination patterns. In our proposed KPA model, one illumination pattern is 
considered to be “sequentially illuminated” by varying plaintext images. 
For example, it is assumed that the attacker collects a total number of Q pairs of 
plaintexts ( )qO n  (n=1, 2, ..., N; q=1, 2, …, Q) and ciphertexts ( )qC m  (m=1, 2, …, M; 
q=1, 2, …, Q). For the thm  illumination pattern ( )mK n  (m=1, 2, …, M; n=1, 2, …, N), 
the following relationship holds, given by Eq. (2). 
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In Eq. (2), each plaintext image qO  [each row in ( )qO n  (n=1, 2, …, M; q=1, 2, …, Q) 
matrix] can be considered as the “
th
q  illumination pattern”, the thm  illumination 
pattern mK  can be considered as the “object image” and all the thm  elements in the Q 
ciphertexts can be considered as “intensity sequence” in the KPA model. The thm  
illumination pattern mK  can be reconstructed from all the plaintext images and all the 
thm  elements in ciphertext single-pixel intensity sequences ( )qC m (q=1, 2, …, Q) with 
conventional reconstruction algorithms [37] in SPI, shown in Fig. 4 (in comparison 
with Fig. 2). Each individual illumination pattern in the key is recovered independently 
from m=1 to m=M. The only difference is that in conventional SPI the object images 
are usually locally smooth in terms of neighboring pixel intensities and the illumination 
patterns are orthogonal or random. Total variation (TV) regularization [37,40] can be 
employed to achieve a high-quality reconstruction with a minimum number of 
illuminations. However, in KPA, each “object image” is a random illumination pattern 
and the “illumination pattern” becomes locally smooth when the roles of images and 
illumination patterns are interchanged. It becomes more difficult to achieve good 
reconstruction results under a low sampling-rate (a small number of plaintext-
ciphertext pairs). 
 
Fig. 4. Proposed KPA model for encrypted SPI. 
 
In this work, the conjugate gradient descent (CGD) algorithm [37,41] is adopted for 
the recovery of illumination patterns from plaintext-ciphertext pairs. More details 
about the working principles of this algorithm can be found in the work [37]. In brief, 
the CGD algorithm is an iterative method to search for an optimal mK  that can best fit 
Eq. (2). In each iteration, the algorithm calculates the gradient to locate the direction 
of steepest descent, then performs a line search to locate the optimum step size. The 
solution moves downhill towards the minimum fitting error efficiently in conjugate 
directions rather than local gradients. After the optimal mK  is obtained, it will be 
normalized and binarized. 
Each single one in the total of M illumination patterns is recovered individually with 
the same approach stated above. Finally, the entire encryption key matrix can be 
recovered and a Type I encryption system is cracked. For a Type II system, we compare 
each recovered pattern with all the publicly known original patterns and map it to the 
most similar one that has not been matched previously by other recovered patterns. 
After the matching steps, the rearranged order of original illumination patterns 
becomes known and the key can be recovered. 
 
4. Ciphertext only attack (COA) to encrypted single pixel imaging (SPI) 
In KPA, multiple pairs of plaintext images and ciphertext intensity sequences are 
known and the illumination patterns (encryption / decryption key) are recovered. In 
COA, only a certain number of single-pixel intensity sequences are available and it is 
a very challenging task to directly recover the illumination patterns. In this work, only 
the COA for a Type II encrypted SPI system under certain conditions is attempted. It 
is assumed that SPI is performed repetitively to the same category of images (e.g. 
different handwritten numbers). The attacker cannot access any of the original object 
images (plaintexts). However, the attacker may collect a large number of exemplar 
images similar to the actual object images.  
The basic idea is that the single-pixel intensity values recorded with the same 
illumination pattern for the same category of object images follow a certain statistical 
distribution. The attacker may be able to figure out the illumination patterns by 
comparing the histograms of single-pixel intensity values generated from the actual 
object images with the ones virtually generated from the exemplar object images he 
has collected. 
 
 Fig. 5. Proposed COA model for encrypted SPI. 
 
For a Type II system, the goal of attacking is to find the order how the original 
sequence of illumination patterns is permutated. From Q object images, Q single pixel 
intensity sequences ( )qC m  (q=1, 2, …, Q) can be recorded with the thm  rearranged 
illumination pattern in the key. The attacker also collects Q exemplar images, then Q 
single pixel intensity sequences ' ( )qC m  (q=1, 2, …, Q) can be virtually generated with 
the thm  original illumination pattern. The attacker can generate the intensity sequences 
' (1)qC , 
' (2)qC , …, 
' ( )qC M  (q=1,2,..,Q) for all the M original illumination patterns. For 
the thm  illumination on the actual object images, the attacker compares the statistical 
distribution of ( )qC m  with 
' (1)qC , 
' (2)qC , … 
' ( )qC m  and  (q=1, 2, …, Q) and find the 
most matched one. For example, if (1)qC   is most similar to 
' (5)qC , then the attacker 
can conclude the 5
th
 original illumination pattern is arranged as the 1st one in the 
encryption key. After a mapping for each ( )qC m  to 
' ( )qC m  (m=1,2, …, M), the 
attacker can obtain the correct permutation of the illumination patterns and recover the 
key. 
Mathematically, the similarity in the statistical distributions between [
1
( )C m , 
2
( )C m , …, ( )
Q
C m ] (m=1,2,…,M) and [ ''
1
( )C m , ''
2
( )C m , …, '' ( )
Q
C m ] (
'm =1, 2, …, 
M) can be evaluated in the following way. The intensity values of ( )qC m  and 
' ( )qC m
(q=1, 2, ..., Q) are statistically distributed within a certain range (e.g. [0 20]). The range 
can be divided into uniform intervals with certain bin size. For example, if the bin size 
is 5, there will be four intervals [0 5], [5 10], [10 15] and [15 20]. Then the number of 
intensity values falling into each interval is counted and a vector containing these 
numbers (e.g. [7 13 16 8]) is obtained. The difference between two number-count 
vectors (i.e. histogram) can be measured by their Euclidean distance. ( )qC m  will be 
mapped to '' ( )qC m  if the Euclidean distance between the number-count vectors of 
( )qC m  and 
'' ( )qC m  is smallest, indicating that their statistical distributions are most 
similar. 
 
5. Results and Discussions 
5.1 Known-plaintext attack (KPA) 
In the simulation of KPA, the number of pixels in the object image and in each 
illumination pattern is assumed to be N= 32 32 . Three different numbers of binary 
random illumination patterns, corresponding to three different sampling ratios /M N
=0.4, /M N =0.7 and /M N =1, are tested in an Type I encrypted SPI system. The 
object image is reconstructed with total variation (TV) regularization algorithm [37,41] 
from the illumination patterns and single-pixel intensity sequences. It is assumed that 
a varying number of plaintext images and corresponding ciphertext intensity sequences 
are available to the attacker. The plaintext images are all human face images taken 
from UTKFace dataset [42], with some examples shown in Fig. 6(a). The illumination 
patterns, as the encryption and decryption key, are not known by the attacker originally. 
From these available plaintext-ciphertext pairs, the attacker can crack the encryption 
system and recover the illumination patterns with the KPA method stated in Section 3.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Fig. 6. Object images in simulation: (a)Examples of plaintext images in 
UTKFace dataset [39]; (b) Examples of plaintext images in MISNT database 
[40]; (c)Ten testing images for KPA. 
 
The accuracy of attacking results is evaluated in two ways. First, all the binary pixels 
in the illumination patterns of the correct key and in the cracked illumination patterns 
after attacking are compared and the cracking correct rate (percentage of correct pixels) 
is calculated. Second, ten testing images shown in Fig. 6(c), which are completely 
different from the plaintext images used for attacking, are encrypted by the patterns in 
the correct key and then decrypted with both the correct key and the cracked key using 
our proposed KPA scheme. The average peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) values are 
calculated and compared for these two cases. The attacking results for a Type I 
encrypted SPI system are shown in Table 1 and some examples of final recovered 
images are shown in Fig.7. 
 
Table 1. Results of our proposed KPA scheme for Type I encrypted SPI system. 
N M ( /M N ) Q ( /Q N ) Cracking Correct 
Rate 
32×32 410 (0.4) 1024(1) 0.9668 
2048(2) 0.9935 
3072(3) 0.9978 
4096(4) 0.9991 
32×32 717 (0.7) 1024(1) 0.9655 
2048(2) 0.9957 
3072(3) 0.9974 
4096(4) 0.9983 
32×32 1024 (1) 1024(1) 0.9683 
2048(2) 0.9944 
3072(3) 0.9976 
4096(4) 0.9982 
 
It can be observed from the results in Table 1 and Fig. 7 that the pixels in the 
illumination patterns can be recovered with very high accuracy (e.g. over 99.8%) and 
the test images can be reconstructed with acceptable visual quality (e.g. a PSNR of 
over 16dB) using the recovered key, if the attacker has a sufficient number of plaintext-
ciphertext pairs. In Fig. 7(a), the decrypted (or reconstructed) images with the correct 
key have good fidelity. The decrypted images with random wrong keys appear like 
noise and no information about the actual object image can be visually perceived, 
shown in Fig. 7(b). This indicates that an encrypted SPI system exhibits a substantial 
level of security when the key is not known. However, after our proposed KPA is 
performed, the decrypted images with the recovered key are close to the original 
plaintext images, if the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs available is adequate, 
shown in Fig. 7(c), Fig. 7(d) and Fig. 7(e). 
 
Fig. 7. KPA results when N=32 32  and the sampling rate /M N  is 0.4 (left) 
or 0.7 (right) for a Type I encrypted SPI system: (a) Decrypted results with 
correct key; (b) Decrypted results with random wrong key; (c) Decrypted 
results with recovered key when q=2048; (d) Decrypted results with recovered 
key when q=3072; (e) Decrypted results with recovered key when q=4096. 
 
The results reveal that our proposed KPA scheme is an effective approach to crack a 
Type I encrypted SPI system. It can be observed that when most of the pixels in the 
illumination patterns are successfully recovered (e.g. the correct rate is around 97%), 
the reconstructed object image using recovered patterns will still be rather poor (e.g. 
12dB or 13dB) due to the small percentage of error bits. The encryption system can be 
truly cracked only when the illumination patterns are recovered with very high 
accuracy (e.g. over 99.6%) for complicated grayscale plaintext images [like Fig. 6(c)]. 
Since each illumination pattern in the key is recovered independently one by one in 
our scheme, the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs required for successful attacking 
will not evidently increase when the sampling ratio /M N  increases. However, the 
number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs required for successful attacking is relevant to the 
number of pixels N (or image size). The relationship between cracking correct rate and 
image size is demonstrated in Fig. 8. The results indicate that more plaintext-ciphertext 
pairs will be required for cracking one illumination pattern containing more pixels. 
 Fig. 8 Performance of our proposed KPA scheme for a Type I encrypted SPI 
system when the image size varies (Sampling rate M/N=0.7) 
                      
Our proposed KPA scheme is also implemented for a Type II encrypted SPI system. 
The parameters in the simulation are basically the same as above except that the 
number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs attempted is much smaller. The results are 
demonstrated in Table 2 and Fig. 9. 
 
Table 2. Results of our proposed KPA scheme for a Type II encrypted SPI system. 
N M (M/N) Q (Q/N) Cracking Correct 
Rate 
32×32 410 (0.4) 31 (0.03) 0.9434 
51 (0.05) 0.9929 
72 (0.07) 0.9977 
92 (0.09) 1 
32×32 717 (0.7) 31 (0.03) 0.9219 
51 (0.05) 0.9972 
72 (0.07) 0.9986 
92 (0.09) 1 
32×32 1024 (1) 31 (0.03) 0.8975 
51 (0.05) 0.9936 
72 (0.07) 0.9980 
92 (0.09) 1 
  
Fig. 9. KPA results when N=32 32  and the sampling rate ( /M N ) is 0.4 (left) 
or 0.7 (right) for a Type II encrypted SPI system: (a) Decrypted results with 
correct key; (b) Decrypted results with wrong key; (c) Decrypted results with 
recovered key when q=31; (d)Decrypted results with recovered key when 
q=72; (e) Decrypted results with recovered key when q=92. 
 
From the results above, it can be observed that our proposed scheme can be utilized to 
crack a Type II system as well. The number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs required for 
a successful attack to a Type II system is much smaller than a Type I system. As stated 
in Section 2, the number of possible combinations in the key space is 2MN  for a Type 
I system and M! for a Type II system. The attacker needs to recover every pixel in the 
illumination pattern for a Type I system but only needs to recover the pattern 
permutation for a Type II system. The security strength of a Type II system is 
significantly lower and therefore relatively easy to be cracked. When the entire order 
of permutation is fully recovered (e.g. when Q=92 in Table 2), all the original 
illumination patterns can be rearranged correctly and 100% pixels in the recovered key 
will have correct values (correct rate=1). In comparison, for a Type I system, the 
majority of pixel values can be recovered with our proposed KPA scheme but it is hard 
to achieve 100% correct rate. 
 
5.2 Ciphertext-only attack (COA) 
In the simulation of COA, the number of pixels in the object image and in each 
illumination pattern is assumed to be N= 8 8 , 12 12  and 16 16 . The number of 
binary random illumination patterns M is assumed to be 64. The plaintext images are 
resized digital number images taken from the MISNT database [43], shown in Fig. 
6(b). It is assumed that there are totally Q plaintext images and Q corresponding single-
pixel sequences. The Q single-pixel sequences are the only available data to an attacker. 
A Type II encrypted SPI system is considered and the 64 original illumination patterns 
are randomly permutated by rearranging the order. In addition, it is assumed that the 
attacker can collect Q exemplar images similar to the actual plaintext images. It shall 
be noted that the exemplar images also belong to the MINST database but they are 
different from the Q plaintext images. Both the plaintext images and exemplar images 
are randomly chosen from the MINST database. Since our proposed COA scheme is 
based on statistical features, the number Q has to be sufficiently large, governed by the 
law of large numbers. In the simulation, Q is set to be 6000, 10000 and 14000. In the 
comparison of single-pixel intensity distributions, the intensity value range is [0 15] 
and the bin size is 0.5. The COA results are shown in Table 3 and Fig. 10. 
 
Table 3. Results of our proposed COA scheme for a Type II encrypted SPI system. 
N M Q Cracking 
Correct Rate 
8×8 64 6000 0.8854 
10000 0.9427 
14000 1 
12×12 64 6000 0.7813 
10000 0.9063 
14000 1 
16×16 64 6000 0.5469 
10000 0.6875 
14000 0.8438 
32×32 64 6000 0.03125 
10000 0.046875 
14000 0.0625 
 
From Table 3, it can be observed that our proposed COA scheme can fully crack a 
Type II encrypted SPI system when the image size is sufficiently small, and the number 
of plaintexts Q is sufficiently large. The order of rearranged illumination patterns in 
the key can be possibly fully recovered (correct rate=1). As the image size grows, the 
performance of our proposed COA scheme will become degraded but it can still 
partially recover the key. In Fig. 10(a), several 8 8  English letter images are used as 
the testing plaintext images. After these images are encrypted with the original key, 
they can be successfully decrypted with our recovered key, shown in Fig. 10.  
 
 Fig. 10 COA results when the N=8×8 and M=64 for a Type II encrypted SPI 
system: (a) Original plaintext images; (b) Decrypted results with correct key; 
(c) Decrypted results with wrong key; (d) Decrypted results with recovered 
key when q=6000; (e) Decrypted results with recovered key when q=10000; 
(f) Decrypted results with recovered key when q=14000. 
 
In Fig. 11, the histograms of recorded single-pixel intensity values from 14000 actual 
plaintext images and 14000 exemplar images collected by the attacker for three 
different illumination patterns are presented. The distributions of single-pixel 
intensities generated with the same illumination pattern for two different object image 
sets (belonging to the same image category) are quite similar statistically. But the 
intensity value distributions between different patterns are obviously different. This 
important property is utilized for matching the unknown pattern with a list of original 
patterns to recover the order of permutation. 
Our proposed COA scheme can perform well under some circumstances but may fail 
under other circumstances, due to the following reasons. First, all the plaintext images 
shall be similar and belong to the same category. Ideally, the intensity value at each 
pixel position follows a unique statistical distribution. In this way, the single-pixel 
intensity values will exhibit different statistical features when these images are 
illuminated by different random patterns. If the plaintext images are random and have 
almost no common features in the pixel intensity distribution, it is hard to observe 
distinguishable statistical features in the recorded single-pixel intensity values for 
varying illumination patterns. Second, the attacker needs to collect an adequate number 
of exemplar images similar to the actual images. Ideally, the intensity value in each 
corresponding pixel in the actual images and exemplar images follows the same 
statistical distribution. In our simulation, when the exemplar images collected by the 
attacker are replaced with human face images, instead of number digit images, none of 
the 64 patterns can be recovered in the correct order (N= 8 8 , M=64 and Q=14000). 
Third, as shown in the results above, our proposed COA scheme can work better for 
plaintext images with a smaller number of pixels. It may give poor attacking results or 
even completely fail to work when N is large. Since the single-pixel intensity is a 
weighted sum of all the pixel values in one plaintext image, the features in the intensity 
distributions for different pixels in the plaintext images are more likely to be lost when 
many pixel values are combined into a single-pixel intensity value.   
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Fig. 11. Examples of the histograms for recorded single-pixel intensity values 
from 14000 actual plaintext images (left) and 14000 exemplar images 
collected by the attacker (right) in COA for three different illumination 
patterns: (a) Pattern 1; (b) Pattern 2; (c) Pattern 3. 
 6. Conclusion 
In many previous works, a single-pixel imaging (SPI) system is constructed as an 
optical image encryption system. In such a system, the object image is employed as 
the plaintext, the illumination pattern is employed as the encryption & decryption key 
and the recorded single-pixel intensity sequence is employed as the ciphertext. Like a 
shield and spear relationship, encryption methods and attacking methods play an 
equally critical role in the investigation of a certain type of cryptosystem. Most 
previous works focus on the design of an encrypted SPI system but little corresponding 
cryptanalysis has ever been conducted. In this work, we propose a known-plaintext 
attack (KPA) scheme and a ciphertext-only attack (COA) scheme to an encrypted SPI 
system for the first time. The KPA is implemented by interchanging the roles of 
illumination patterns and object images in a SPI model. The secret illumination 
patterns can be recovered from a set of known plaintext images and ciphertext intensity 
sequences. The COA is implemented based on the statistical features in the distribution 
of single-pixel intensity values when the SPI is performed on the same category of 
images. The attacker can compare the statistical distributions of single-pixel intensity 
values generated from the actual object images and virtually generated from the 
collected exemplar images. The unknown illumination patterns can be recovered after 
being mapped to known original patterns. Simulation results verify the effectiveness 
of our proposed attacking schemes. The two schemes can crack encrypted SPI systems 
and successfully recover the key containing correct illumination patterns. Our 
proposed attacking schemes reveal some security flaws of an encrypted SPI system 
under certain circumstances. In addition, our proposed attacking algorithms may be 
meaningful for other applications similar to the cryptoanalysis of an optical encryption 
system, like scattering imaging.    
  
Funding 
National Natural Science Foundation of China (61805145, 11774240); Leading talents 
of Guangdong province program (00201505); Natural Science Foundation of 
Guangdong Province (2016A030312010); Science and Technology Innovation 
Commission of Shenzhen (KQJSCX20170727100838364) 
 
References 
1. B. Javidi, A. Carnicer, M. Yamaguchi, T. Nomura, E. Perez-Cabre, M. S. Millan, 
N. K. Nishchal, R. Torroba, J. F. Barrera, W. Q. He, X. Peng, A. Stern, Y. 
Rivenson, A. Alfalou, C. Brosseau, C. L. Guo, J. T. Sheridan, G. H. Situ, M. 
Naruse, T. Matsumoto, I. Juvells, E. Tajahuerce, J. Lancis, W. Chen, X. D. Chen, 
P. W. H. Pinkse, A. P. Mosk, and A. Markman,  “Roadmap on optical security,” 
Journal of Optics 18(8), 083001(2016). 
2. S. Liu, C. Guo, and J. T. Sheridan, “A review of optical image encryption 
techniques,” Opt. Laser Technol. 57, 327-342(2014). 
3. S. Jiao, C. Zhou, Y. Shi, W. Zou, and Li, X, “Review on optical image hiding and 
watermarking techniques,” Opt. Laser Technol. 109, 370-380(2019). 
4. P. Refregier and B. Javidi, “Optical image encryption based on input plane and 
Fourier plane random encoding,” Opt. Lett. 20, 767–769(1995). 
5. E. Tajahuerce and B. Javidi, “Encrypting three-dimensional information with 
digital holography,” Appl. Opt. 39(35), 6595-6601(2000). 
6. B. Javidi and T. Nomura, “Securing information by use of digital holography,” 
Opt. Lett. 25(1), 28-30(2000). 
7. X. Li, M. Zhao, Y. Xing, L. Li, S. T. Kim, X. Zhou, and Q. H. Wang, “Optical 
encryption via monospectral integral imaging,” Opt. Express 25(25), 31516-
31527(2017). 
8. X. Li, S. Cho, and S. Kim, “High security and robust optical image encryption 
approach based on computer-generated integral imaging pickup and iterative back-
projection techniques,” Opt. Laser. Eng. 55, 162-182(2014). 
9. H. Li, C. Guo, I. Muniraj, B. C. Schroeder, J. T. Sheridan, and S. Jia, “Volumetric 
light-field encryption at the microscopic scale,” Sci. Rep. 7, 40113(2017). 
10. Y. Shi, T. Li, Y. Wang, Q. Gao, S. Zhang, and H. Li, “Optical image encryption 
via ptychography,” Opt. Lett. 38(9), 1425-1427(2013). 
11. A. Pan, K. Wen, and B. Yao, “Linear space-variant optical cryptosystem via 
Fourier ptychography,” Opt. Lett. 44(8), 2032-2035 (2019). 
12. P. Clemente, V. Durán, E. Tajahuerce, and J. Lancis, “Optical encryption based on 
computational ghost imaging,” Opt. Lett. 35(14), 2391-2393(2010). 
13. M. Tanha, R. Kheradmand, and S. Ahmadi-Kandjani, “Gray-scale and color 
optical encryption based on computational ghost imaging,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 
101(10), 101108(2012). 
14. W. Chen and X. Chen, “Ghost imaging using labyrinth-like phase modulation 
patterns for high-efficiency and high-security optical encryption,” Europhysics 
Lett. 109(1), 14001(2015). 
15. Y. Qin and Y. Zhang, “Information encryption in ghost imaging with customized 
data container and XOR operation,” IEEE Photonics J. 9(2), 1-8(2017). 
16. Z. Pan and L. Zhang, “Optical cryptography-based temporal ghost imaging with 
chaotic laser,” IEEE Photonic. Tech. L. 29(16), 1289-1292(2017). 
17. K. Yi, Z. Leihong, and Z. Dawei, “Optical encryption based on ghost imaging and 
public key cryptography,” Opt. Laser. Eng. 111, 58-64(2018). 
18. Z. Zhang, S. Jiao, M. Yao, X. Li, and J. Zhong, “Secured single-pixel broadcast 
imaging,” Opt. Express 26(11), 14578-14591(2018). 
19. S. Jiang, Y. Wang, T. Long, X. Meng, X. Yang, R. Shu, and B. Sun, “Information 
Security Scheme Based on Computational Temporal Ghost Imaging,” Sci. Rep. 
7(1), 7676(2017). 
20. J. Wu, Z. Xie, Z. Liu, W. Liu, Y. Zhang, and S. Liu, “Multiple-image encryption 
based on computational ghost imaging,” Opt. Commun 359, 38-43(2016). 
21. S. Jiao, C. Zhou, W. Zou, and X. Li, “Non-destructive ghost authentication for 
single-pixel imaging in mass user environment,” Laser Phys. 28(9), 096203(2018). 
22. M. P. Edgar, G. M. Gibson, and M. J. Padgett, “Principles and prospects for single-
pixel imaging.” Nat. Photonics 13, 13–20 (2019). 
23. M. J. Sun, and J. M. Zhang, “Single-pixel imaging and its application in three-
dimensional reconstruction: a brief review,” Sensors 19(3), 732 (2019). 
24. G. Situ and J. Zhang, “Double random-phase encoding in the Fresnel domain,” 
Opt. Lett. 29(14), 1584-1586(2004). 
25. G. Unnikrishnan, J. Joseph, and K. Singh, “Optical encryption by double-random 
phase encoding in the fractional Fourier domain,” Opt. Lett. 25(12), 887-
889(2000). 
26. E. Pérez-Cabré, H. C. Abril, M. S. Millán, and B. Javidi, “Photon-counting double-
random-phase encoding for secure image verification and retrieval,” Journal of 
Optics 14(9), 094001(2012). 
27. S. Jiao, Z. Zhuang, C. Zhou, W. Zou, and X. Li, “Security enhancement of double 
random phase encryption with a hidden key against ciphertext only attack,” Opt. 
Commun 418, 106-114(2018). 
28. J. Chen, Y. Zhang, J. Li, and L. B. Zhang, “Security enhancement of double 
random phase encoding using rear-mounted phase masking,” Opt. Laser. Eng. 101, 
51-59 (2018). 
29. U. Gopinathan, D. S. Monaghan, T. J. Naughton, and J. T. Sheridan, “A known-
plaintext heuristic attack on the Fourier plane encryption algorithm,” Opt. Express 
14, 3181–3186(2006). 
30. X. Peng, H. Wei, and P. Zhang, “Chosen-plaintext attack on lensless double-
random phase encoding in the Fresnel domain,” Opt. Lett. 31 3261–3263(2006). 
31. Y. Frauel, A. Castro, T.J. Naughton, and B. Javidi, “Resistance of the double 
random phase encryption against various attacks,” Opt. Express 15 10253–
10265(2007). 
32. C. Guo, S. Liu, and J. T. Sheridan, “Iterative phase retrieval algorithms. Part II: 
Attacking optical encryption systems,” Appl. Opt. 54, 4709–4718(2015). 
33. X. Liu, J. Wu, W. He, M. Liao, C. Zhang, and X. Peng, “Vulnerability to 
ciphertext-only attack of optical encryption scheme based on double random phase 
encoding,” Opt. Express 23, 18955–18968(2015). 
34. G. Li, W. Yang, D. Li, and G. Situ, “Cyphertext-only attack on the double random-
phase encryption: Experimental demonstration,” Opt. Express 25, 8690–
8697(2017). 
35. S. Jiao, G. Li, C. Zhou, W. Zou, and X. Li, “Special ciphertext-only attack to 
double random phase encryption by plaintext shifting with speckle correlation,” J. 
Opt. Soc. Am. A 35, A1–A6(2018). 
36. S. Yuan, J. Yao, X. Liu, X. Zhou, and Z. Li, “Cryptanalysis and security 
enhancement of optical cryptography based on computational ghost imaging,” Opt. 
Commun. 365, 180-185(2016). 
37. L. Bian, J. Suo, Q. Dai, and F. Chen, “Experimental comparison of single-pixel 
imaging algorithms,” J. Opt. Soc. Am. A 35(1), 78-87(2018). 
38. Z. Zhang, X. Wang, G. Zheng, and J. Zhong, “Hadamard single-pixel imaging 
versus Fourier single-pixel imaging,” Opt. Express 25(16), 19619-19639(2017). 
39. Z. Zhang, X. Wang, G. Zheng, and J. Zhong, “Fast Fourier single-pixel imaging 
via binary illumination,” Sci. Rep. 7(1), 12029(2017). 
40. J. Suo, L. Bian, F. Chen, and Q. Dai, “Signal-dependent noise removal for color 
videos using temporal and cross-channel priors,” J. Vis. Commun. Image R. 36, 
130–141(2016). 
41. M. R. Hestenes and E. Stiefel, “Methods of conjugate gradients for solving linear 
systems,” J. Res. Natl. Bur. Stand. 49, 409–436(1952). 
42. Z. Zhang, Y. Song, and Qi, H, “Age progression/regression by conditional 
adversarial autoencoder,” In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer 
Vision and Pattern Recognition, 5810-5818 (2017). 
43. Y. LeCun, L. Bottou, Y. Bengio, and P. Haffner, "Gradient-based learning applied 
to document recognition." P. IEEE 86(11), 2278-2324(1998). 
 
